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INTRODUCTION
0----- __
Trust estates and trust funds have ever been care-
fully gaurded and protected, both at law and equity. The
law lays down the most stringent and arbitrary rules for
the guidance of those, who are entrusted with the manage-
ment uf such property. The path of duty, when not
pointed out by the trust instrument itself, is carefully
mapped out by the law and he who assumes to discharge a
trust duty must keep within the narrow path laid out.
He steps without, uhdei, an., circumstances, only at his
peril.
The general theory of following trust funds seems to
be:- That whenever the trust fund has been converted in-
to another species of property, that if its identity can
be traced it will be held in its new form liable to the
righta of the cestui que trust; or as the product of it,
equity will follow it, unless the greater equity of a -
bona fide holderfottgalue without notice, should inter-
vene. Thus through all the changes the trust may under-
go if the article substituted can be identified as such
substitute it will be impressed with the trust. The
right of following it only fails, when the power of iden-
tification is lost. And this, according to the views
of those who follcw what is~known, in this country, as
the general rule, is the case when the subject is turned
into money andmixed and confounded in a mass of property
of the same kind.
TPUSt MONEY INVESTED WITH THAT OF THE TRUSTEE.
Where it can be showm that the trust fund has gone b
to swell another fund, or has been used in the purchaee
of property, thougL the part purchased with trust funds,
arid the part not so purchasea are entirely mixed, what
in such a case are the rights of a zestui que trust? Is
le relegated to the rights of a simple creditor, or, if
not what are his rights?
This question asually arises when a trustee, after
having used the trust funds contrary to his duty, becomes
insolvent and the cestui que trust endeavors to enforce
a claim to priority against the general creditors. If
the trust fund were traceable to a separate piece of
property therecould be no question, and there would oe
none, and still it is contrary to all sense of justice
and equity, if because the trustee has mingled the trust
money with his own, the cestui que trust shall lose all
rights against the property purchased with hi3 maoney.
Such a rule could only be defended on the supposition
that when the trust fund is mi,-id with otter money it is
beyond the power of equity to grant the relief, which is
granted when the trust fund is not so confused. Th1is
(a)
does not now appear to be the rule, although years ago
(b)
such was considered to be the rule. Where the trust
fund is traceable into a certain investment, and the part
it bears to the whole sum so invested is capable of bein.-
proven, the cestui que trust should be allowed to treat
the investments aa imade for his benefit in the sane way
that he could if all the money so invested had been his.
That is to say, thtat he should be entitled to such a pro-
portion of the whole as his trust money so invested, bore
(c)
to the whole sum so investea.
The fundamental reason in one case as in the other
being that a trustee should het and cannot be allowed to
make a profit out of a wrongful act. If the property
(a) Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 C11. Div. 696.
(b) Whitcomb v. JacGbs, 1 Salk. 160.
(c) Taylor v. Plumraer, 3 Maule &e S. 562.
which he wrongfully purchased were held to be subject
otly to a lien for the amount invested an# increase in
value would go to a wrong doer.
It will often happen, nevertheless, that the cestui
que trust cannot identify any property as being purchased
wholly or in any definite proportion with his money,
and therefore equity cannot regard him as the owner of
any property either individually or in common, and yet
he can show that the trust fund has gone to swell the
general assets of the trustee's estate, as where the
money has been usea in a business which afterwards be-
comes bankrmpt. Here strictly speak ing there can hard-
ly be a trust, as it is as necessary for equitable as
for legal ownership that there should be fixed property
as the subject matter of it. In both cases the necessity
rests rather on the nature of things than on any rule of
law. It would , however, be in the highest degree un-
just that the rights of the cestui q-e trust should be
made to depend on whether his property is distinguisha-
ble from the general mass of the trustee's property, or
indistinguishable. Though noplesslyconfused with the
trustee's , still his money or- aproceeds is there, and
if equity c an by any means work it out he should be en-
5abled to get at it, Equity accomplishes justice in such
a case by giving the cestui que trust a lien upon the
propertyr,- a right to be paid from the estate in priori-
ty to the general creditors. This latter right the ces-
tui que trust always has though he also iray be able to
(a)
follow his money into a certain investment/ In case the
investment has turned out badly, it would be for his ad-
vantage not to regard the investment as being maae for
him, but assume that it had been wrongfully converted,
and take alien on what was purchased with his money and
co me in with the general creditors for any deficiency
(b)
ocasioned by the depreciation of the investment.
If a trustee purchase real estate partly with his *&
own property and partly with trust funds, it is universal
ly allowed that the cestui que trust has a claim in equi-
ty against the land, but the exact nature of the right
allowed is not uniformly agreed upon. If the property
purchased should increase in value, it id for his inter-
est to obtain an undivided share of it rather than a lien
-------------------------------------------------------
(a) Monroe v. Collin, 95 Mo. o3; Cook v. Tullis,
18 Wall. 332; Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 476.
(b) Riehl v. The Foundry, 104 Ind. 70.
on the property for the bare amount of the trust money
invested. If the proportion which the trust money bore
to the purchase money is known or acertainable, the larg-
er right should it seems be allowed, as the trustee's ea-
tate otherwise benefits by the misappropriation. Fte
question has not however, been very fully discussed and
the decisions do not appear to be uniform. in England
the point san 4ardly be considered settled, but in Knatch
bull v. Hallett, Jessell , M. R., after speaking of the
cestui que trust's right to elect either to take the
property purchased, or to hold it as a security for the
amount of the trust money laid out in the purchase, says:
"But in the second case, where a trustee has mixed the ;m
money with his own there is this distinction, t-at the
cestui que trust, or beneficial owner, can no longer e-
lect to take the property, because it is no longer
bought with the trust money purely, and simply, but with
a mixed fund. He is, however, still entitlea to a
charge on the property pnrchased for the amount of the
trust money laid out in the purchase."
The general rtle in this country allows the cestui
que trust to recover a specific share of tle property
purchased with any portion of such trust funas.(a)
(a) Perry on Trusts. Sec. 427; Jones v. Dexter, 13C
Mass. 380; Schlaefer v. ('orson, 52 Barb. 510.
TRUST FUNDS MINGLE) WITH TH]OSE OF THE
TRUSTEE IN THE SAME BANK ACCOUNT.
------------0 ----
A question similar to that which has been consider-
ed, arises where trust money is paid into a 6ank to the
private account of the trustee, funas of h-is own being
paid to the same account. Here the question is not
W"1tlher the cestui que trust is entitled to a lien o- a
proportionate part, for it is entirely immaterial in the
case of money, but whether he ns any rights at all a-
gainst the bank account. Tlhere can be little doubt,
that, according to the older English precedents, tn e
question would have to be answered in the negative. ljon-
ey, when mixed with other money, coula not be followed
(a)
because it had no "ear marks".
A consideration of these old cases led Justice Fry,
as Akte as 1879, to decide that the rights of the cestui
(b)
que trust were lost. In deciding as he did in this
case Justice Fry took occasion to say that equity and
justice was against the rule; but that nevertheless he
considered the rule well settlea. Thus the law remain-
(a) Whitcomb v. Jacobs, 1 Salk. 160.
(b) Ex parte Dale, l1 CH. Div. 772.
ed until Sir George Jessell, i. P., in the famous cese
of Knatchbull v. hallett, after thoroughly reviewing
all the authorities frankly acknowledged that such was
formerly the law, but t:hat he was of the opinion that
equity had advanced. He therefore over-ruled Justice
Fry, and as the law now stands moneymaybe followed in
the same manner as any other chatels Along as it can be
traced into a specific fund. Thus we escape the con-
sequence of a trustee mingling a small sum of his own,
with the trust funds, and thereby making of -iimself a
debtor instead of a trustee, when in truth the trust fund
is still in existence and in his charge.
In Knatchbull v. Iallett, Jessell, M. R., says:-
"Supposing, instead of being invested in thae purchasa of
land or goods, the monies were simply mixed with other
monies of the trustee, using the term again in its full
sense as including every person in a fiduciary relation,
aoes it mage any difference according to the modern doc-
trine of equity? 1 say none. It would be very -emark-
able if it were to d.o:so. Supposing the trust money
was 1000 sovereigns andthe trustee put them in a bag,
andby ,,iistai~e, 'acciaent or ctherwise, aropped a sover.
eign of his own into the bag, could anybody suppose that
a judge in equity would find any difficultr in sayin'g
t.Lat tn- cestui que trust has a rigt to take a tious-
anla sovereigns out of that bag? I do not like to c :;ll
it a charge of 1000 sovereigns on the 1001 sovereigns,
but ti-.at is the effect of it. 1 ive no doubt of it.
It would make no difference if, instead of one sovereign
it was anotiier 1000 sovereigns; but instead of putting it
into his bag, or, after putting it into his bag, he car-
ries the bag to nis bankers, what then? According to
law, the bankerh are his debtors for t total amount;
but if you lend the trust money to a third person, you
can follow it. If in the case pupposed the trustee had
lent "he 1000 sovereigns to a man without security, you
could follow tne debt and t.'ke it from the debtor. if
he lent it on a promissory note, you could take the prom-
issory note; or the bond, if it were a bond. if, in-
stead of lending the wkiole amount in one sum simply, h-e
Lad addea a sovereign, or nad added 5000 sovereigns of
his own to the 1000 sovereigns, the only difference is
this; ti~at instead of taking the bond or the promissory
note, the cestui que trust would Lave a charge for the
amountlof trhe trust money on the bond or promissory note.
So it would be on the simple contract debt; that is, if
the debt we *e of such a nature as th"at, between the cr d-
itor and thedebtor, you could not sever the debt in two
so as to show what part -:ras trust money, then the cestui
que trust would have a right to a charge on th: whole."
RULE ThEL THE T USTEE 11AS DRA7TN AGAI.TST
THE ACCOUNT
In most of the cases w.;ich arise on this point there
is a difficulty encountered not heretofore referred to;
that is the trustee after mingling his own and the trust
money in the private bank account draws on the account
to a greater or less extent. Can the aestui que trust
still claim to be reimbursed in full from the amount
left on deposit, or s ,ould it rather be held that a por-
tion of themoney withdrawn was his?
It is a general presumption of law, whenit becomes
important to decide, to which of several deposits, drafts
drawn on the gener l account should be charged, that the
deposits shAll be deemed to have bepn drawn out in the
order in which they were put in, so that each draft wv.en
paid would be charged against tne earliest deposit in the
account. (e)
(a) Clavton's Case, 1 Mer. 572.
f:.is is a general rule appliea in all ,ercc.ntile
transactions; and was followed in Pennell v. Deffell, 4
DeJ. M. & G. 372, wich was a case lher- trust funds wet'-
30 deposite. and drriwn against as to indivate tat a por-
tion of tr.> trust fund i, d been used. T Ais rule was ap-
proved, and followed b-, a number of later English aecis-
ions ; but in the celebratea case of Knatchbull v. Hall-
ett, tLe court aft,:r faving disposed of the view that the
cestui que trust had no claim at all, decided th-at the
presumption did not arise, when the account is composed
in part of trust funds and in part of the trustee's pri-
vate funds, out that in such a case it should be presum-
ed that the trustee drew out what he had a right to
draw out, to wit, 1 is own money. In deciding this lat-
ter point, Sir George Jessell, M. 7., said:- "Now upon
principle, nothing can be better settled, either in our
law, or I suppose, the law of all civilized countries,
than this, thaat where a man does an act which fay right-
fully be performed, lie cannot say that the act was in-
tentiofally and in fact done wrongly. A man who has a
right of entry can not say he com nitted a trespas3 in en-
tering. A man who sells the goods of another as agent
for the owner can not prevent the owner adopting the
sale, and deny that he acted for the owner, It runs
throughout our law, ana we are familiar with numerous in-
stances in tLe law of real property. A man wh1o grants
a lease, believing he has sufficient estate to grant it,
although it turns out that he ha3 not, but Las a power
whicl enables Lim to grant it, h.e is not allowed to ia:r
ti.at he did not grant it under the power. Whenever it
can be doae rightfully, he is not allowed to say, against
a person entitled to the property or the right, t-at Le
has done it wrongfully. That is th.e universel law."
This tior oughly sound, just, and equitable doctrine
has with but few exceptions, notably the courts of Maine
(a)
and Pennsylvania, been the rule of the American courts.
(a) Knatchbull v. lallett, L. R. 13 CH. Div. 696.
National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54.
VanAlen v. Th-e Bank, 52 IT. Y. 11.
Overseers v. .ank of Virginia, 2 Gratt. 544.
United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30.
Hooley v. Gieve, 9 Abb. N. C. 8 Aff 82 N.Y.5,3L.
Baker v. Bank, 100 N.Y. 61.
WHEN TH.E TRUST FUND HAS BEEN
WI T1iDRAWVLq
If in such a case as we nave be n considering the
balance in the bank to the creait of the trustee should
fall below the amount of the trust fund; the conclusion
that as to the difference between the two, the trust mon-
ey has been drawn out is inevitable and must be aaopted.
Thus as to the difference the cestui que trust must take
up the scent and endeavor to trace t-is difference into
its present lodgment and there force cis claim against i
Failing to successfully trace and identify the specific
fund or its proceeds, ±ie must content himeelf with the
(a)
position of an ordinary creditor. Nor, following the
reasoning of the above cases, will subsequent deposits
of the trustee's own money give any larger rights, in tl:e
absence of special sircumstances showing a purpose on
the part of the trustee to make up the deficiency in the
trust fund, and such a purpose will not be presumed as a-
gainst general creaitors of the trustee. TLerefore, un-
less it be proven that the subsequent deposits were made
(a) Continental Ban v. Weems,69 Tex. 489;
Cavin v. Gleasman, 105 N. Y. 254.
Philadelph ia Bank v. Dowd, 2L. R. Ann. 430.
Neele-Y v. Pood, 54 Mich. 134.
for the purpose of restoring the trust fund, the equi-
table charge of the cestui que trust cannot exceed the
smallest balance to the trustee's credit, since the de-
posit of the trust funds. Therefore, if the balance
shpuld be wiped out, but for a day, the cestui que trust
(a)
would be relegatea to the position of a simple creditor.
TRUST MONEY A PART OF THE TRUSTEE'S ESTATE.
It is not necessary to trace the trust fund into
some specific property in order to enforce the trust; if
it can be traced into the estate of the ag-nt or trustee
(b)
it is sufficient. Thus, wher- a bank receives money as
agent whichit mixes with its own funas, tr.e principAl,
on the failure of the bank, is not required to show into
what particular assett of the bank this money went, but
need only show that it went into such assetts in some
form, tchus increasing themin that amount. A case upon
all fours with; this statement is found in People v. Bank
(a) Cavin v. Gleason, 105 IN. Y. 254; Con. Bk. v.
Weems, 69 Tex. 489.
(b)McLeod v. Evans, 28 N. W. 173; People v. Bank of
Rochester, 96 ii. Y. 32.
(a)
of Rochester. The defendant bank having discounted cer-
tain notes for the firm of S. H. & F. , a depositor with
it, and that firm, wishing to anticipate jayment, gave
to the bank its checks for the amount of the notes less
rebate of interest; which checks the bank received and
charged in the firm account, and entries were made in the
bank books to the effect that the notes were paid. The
firm at the time supposed that the bank held the notes,
but they had in fact previously sold by it. Before the
notes came due the bank failed. Held, that an order re-
quiting the receiver to I-ay the notes out of the fiinds in
his hands was properly granted; that the transaction be-
tween the bank and said firm was not in their relation
of debtor and creditor, not in that of bank and depositor
but by it a trust was created, the violation of which
constitues a fraud by which the bank could not profit,
and to the benefit of which the receiver was not enti-
tled.
This case has been warmly approved of in many of
(a) People v. Bank of Rochester, 96 N. Y. 32.
our sister states. Several cases in Kansas involving
facts almost identicil with those involved in this case,
(a)
have been decided in the :3ame way.
The decided weight oif authorityT is, I think, shown
by these cases. True there are some cases to the con-
trary, but they are now in the minority. In the case
of the Illinois Trust Bank v. The National Bank of Buffa-
(b)
lo, the circuit court for the N. D. of New York reached
an opposite result, holding that though the defendant
had collected a draft as agent for the plaintiff, and had
kept instead of remitting the proceeds, and in a few
days had suspended payment, the plaintiff had no priority
over other credey'. Several years later our Supreme
Court on almost the same statement of.facts held contra;
(c)
andfollowed the case of the People v. Bank of Rochester.
(a) Elliott v. Barnes, 31 Kan. 170; Peak v. Elliot:,
30 Kan. 156; Harrison v. Smith, 83 Mo. 210; Stolle-
v. Coates, 3? Mo. 511; Thompson v. T , Gloucester
Bank, 8 A P. ep. 97; Bowers v. Evans, 36 N. W. 629;
McLeod v. Evans, 28 N. W. 173; Jones v. Eilbreth,
31 N. E. 346; People v. Bank of Dansville, 39 Hun
187.
(b) Trust Bank v. Nat. Bk. of Buffalo, 15 Fed. Rep.
85w •
(c) Pec-le v. Ban: (f Dansville, 39 Hun, 1EV';
McCo ll v. Fv>:ev, 40 H i 114.
LIMITATIONS 0N THE TFUSTEF'S RIG}IT
rTO . ... RC A .... . .. ..
While we ilit ,-asonably deduce, as a rule from
what we have already demonstrated, that, where money has
been used to swell the assetts or benefit the estate in
any way, a trust may be enforced. This rule seems, at
first glance, to be the only logical deduction from the
authorities we have been examining, and it has been so
declared by a number of courts in our Western states.
Such seems not to be the case, according to the more
closely reasoned cases. They holdit is not enough that
the trust money should have been used to the benefit of
the private estate. It must be shown that in some form
or another the trust fund went into the property which is
Scught to be charged, and still forms a part of it, or
the cestri que trust has no greater right s than any oth-
(a)
er creditor. The leading ease on this point, although
(b)
not the earliest, i, Cavin v. Gleason. Here a sum of
money had been placed in the hands of one White to be in-
(a) Continental Bank v. Weeffs, 69 Tex. 489;
Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 254;
Philadelphia Bank v. Dowd, 2 L. R. Ann. 480.
(b) 105 11. V. 254 '
vested by him on bond and mortgage. Instead of so doing
he used the entire fund except $30, in paying his -erson-
al debts, and soon thereafter made an assignment, the
$30 coming into the hands of the assignee. It was held
by the court reversing the General Term, that the ploin-
tiff could claim priorit: only to the extent of $30, the
amount traced into the hands of the assignee. Andrews,
J., in discussing the rule of law, as to tracing trust
prop rty, and its proper limitation says:- "If it app ;ars
that trust property has been wrongfully converted by the
trustee, and constitutes, though in a changed form, a
part qf the assetts, it would seem to be equitable and in
accordance with equitable prihciples that the things in-
to which the trust prop erty has been changed should, if
required, be set apart for the trust, or, if' separation
is impossible, that priority of lien should be adjudged
in faver of the trust estate for the value of the trust
property or funds or proceeds of the trust propert,,en-
tering into and constituting a part of the assets. This
rule simply asserts the right of the true owner to his
own Iroperty. But it is a general rile, as well in a
court of equity as in a court of law, that, in order to
follow trust funds and subject them to the operation of
he trust, they must be identified. A court of equity,
in pursuing the inquiry and administering relief, is less
hampered by 'technical difficulties than a court of law;
and it ma- be sufficient to entitle a party to equitable
preference in the distribution of a fdnd in insolvency,
that it app'ears that the fund or pioperty of the insol-
vent remaining for distribution includes the proceeds of,
the trust estate, although it may be impossible to point
out the precise thing in which the trust fund has been
invested, or the precise time when the conversion took
place. The authorities require, at least this distinct-
ness in the iroof before preferonce can be awarded."
This case has been selerely criticized by several
courts holding the opposite theory, upon a cestui que
trust's right to apreference in such a case. But with
due resp"ect for the opinions of those who criticize it,
I think, it is based upon law and equity. At all events
it is the law of New York upon the right of a cestui que
trust to a pref-rence over simple creditors, and will e-
ventually mark the line beyond which preferences will not
be allowed, in most jurisdictions.
CRITICISM OF THE RULE THAT THE RIGHT TO FOLLOW TRUST
MONEY CEASES WHiEN THE SAKE IS MIXED WITH OTHER MONEY.
----- -___
The long line of decisions in the several state and
1!ederal courts, which hold that the right to follow trust
property ceases, when the means of' ascertainmvnt and i-
dentification fail, as where the subject matter is turned
into money, and i ixed and. confounded in a general mass of
property of the same description, aret*t based upon law
or rrecedent.
In the case of the Illinois Trust ahd Savings Bank
(a)
v. First Nat. Bank of Buffalo, the defendant bank had
collected a draft as agent for the Illinois' bank, and had
kept and m~ingled the proceeds with its own funds instead
of remitting the same, and in a few days suspended pay-
ment, and upon a suil by the Illinois band for the fund
so held, it was decided that the plaintiffhad no priori-
ty over general creditors.
Wallace, J., saying:- "The cases hold that if a
trustee h-:s converted a trust fund into money and min-
gled the proceeds with his other moneys, so that they
(a) Ill. Trust and Say. Bank v. lI t r at. Bk. of Buf-
falo, 15 Fed. 858.
wvere indistinguishable, the cestui que trust cannot fol-
low his fund into the hands of an assignee in bankruptcy,
or of an executor of such trustee, but must occupy the
position of a general creditor of the estate." The
court then cites as authority for its statement the case
(a)
of Whitcomb v. Jacobs, and Story on Equity Jurispru-
dence.
Now upon an investigation of the adthorities cited
in Story as sustaining this proposition I find three cas-
(b)
es, and strange to say not one of them is In authority
for the proposition laid down in 8tory. Indeed one of
the cases is first class authority for the converse prop-
osition. This case is Coperan v. Gallant, which I here
reproduce in full:-
"A. ri-de a bill of sale of some leases and personal
estate to B. and C. in trust to pay A's debts; at first
B. acted in the trust but afterwards C. took the whole
into his possession, and acted alone, arxi became a bank-
rupt. Upon which A. brought a bill against C. and oth-
ers under the conmission of bankruptcy to account touch-
(a)VWhitcomb v. Jacobs, 1 Salk. 160; Story on Eq.
Juris. Sec. 1259;
(b) Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P. Yrms. 319-20; Ryall v.
Roole, 1 Atk. 172; Leigh v. Macauley, 1 Younge &
Coll. 260-5.
ilg the lersonal estate of A. so assigned in trust for
the payment of his debts, as aforesaid. Therefore the
assignees under the commision sued out against C. were
ordered to account for all t e estate of A. which the
court declared per Lord Couper, should not be liable to
the bankruptcy of C. "
Upon the case of Whitcomb v. Jacobs and Ryall v.
(a)
Rolle aS authority for Story's proposition, Jessell, 11. R1
speaking particularly of the latter case has this to say;
"It is the same as Whitcomb v. Jacobs(l SalL. 160). You
may follow the goods, but 7ou cannot follow the money.
That is no longer law." Without taking up more space,
it is sufficient to say, that a reading of Leigh v. Mac-
auley, will show it to be an authority, f one at all,
sustaining the opposite to what Story cites it to sus-
tain.
My slight investigation leads me to the conclilsion,
that text book writers, even of the conceded ability of
the great Story, are responsible for a great many of the
mistakes of our courts, relying, as they apparently do,
---------------- ------------------------------------
(a) Whitcomb v. Jacobs, 1 Salk. 160;
Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 172.
Knatchbull v. Hallett, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696.
23.
upon the unstpported dicta of text book writers.
In Pennsylvania the first case involving the facts
I have bean considering is decided upon the authority of
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 1259. Again in Maine
(a)
and Indiana I find the same state of affairs exist. All
the later cases arising in these states follow the same
rule. Thus it is seen how one great text-book writer
hIs led the courts of a number of our most prominent
states astrayrfrom the course of authority and justice.
(a) Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. St. 16;
Hopkin's Appeal, 8 Cen. Rep. 860;
McComas v. Long 85 Ind. 549;
Goodell v. Buck, 67 Me. 514

